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ABSTRACT
Objective: This collective case study examined how and why specific organizational decision-making
processes transpired at 2 large suburban county health departments in lower New York State during
their response to Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The study also examined the relationships that the agencies
developed with other emerging and established organizations within their respective health systems.
Methods: In investigating these themes, the authors conducted in-depth, one-on-one interviews with
30 senior-level public health staff and first responders; reviewed documentation; and moderated
2 focus group discussions with 17 participants.
Results: Although a natural hazard such as a hurricane was not an unexpected event for these health
departments, they nevertheless confronted a number of unforeseen challenges during the response
phase: prolonged loss of power and fuel, limited situational awareness of the depth and breadth of the
storm’s impact among disaster-exposed populations, and coordination problems with a number of
organizations that emerged in response to the disaster.
Conclusions: Public health staff had few plans or protocols to guide them and often found themselves
improvising and problem-solving with new organizations in the context of an overburdened health care
system (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2016;page 1 of 7).
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Hurricane Sandy made landfall along thenorthern Atlantic Coast of the United Stateson October 29, 2012, affecting 24 states in a
disaster that covered the largest land mass in US
history, stretching from Maine to Florida. More than
130 people were killed on the US eastern seaboard,
and nearly $71 billion dollars in damages were
reported.1 The hurricane struck the New York
metropolitan area, causing large-scale evacuations,
while also severely damaging more than 120,000
housing units. The 2 suburban county health depart-
ments that were the focus of this study are in close
proximity to New York City and are home to a
combined population of more than 2.5 million
residents. During Hurricane Sandy, these counties
faced wind gusts up to 90mph and storm surges up to
14 feet.2
Although the wind and water destruction caused by
Hurricane Sandy was somewhat predictable, the
subsequent nor’easter prolonged existing power
outages and fuel and heating shortages that lasted days
to weeks and that subsequently placed an enormous
strain on the public health system response. Even
though many public health professionals and health
care delivery providers were forced to evacuate and
were victims of the storm themselves, hundreds of
professionals worked around the clock to provide
support for emergency operations during Hurricane
Sandy. Ensuring continuity of essential public health
functions necessitated multiagency, multisectoral
coordination with traditional and nontraditional
stakeholders, including regional hospitals, nursing
homes, shelters, transportation organizations, and
private businesses from across the health system.
As noted in this study, the local public health disaster
response to Hurricane Sandy was adaptive. Before the
storm, both agencies planned their organizational
responses using the traditional incident command
system and assigned leadership roles (eg, operations,
logistics, finance) more than 72 hours in advance.
Still, much of the response proved challenging,
including the duration of the response, the ability for
the workforce to respond, and emergent challenges in
staffing a special needs shelter.
There is still much to learn about individual and orga-
nizational decision-making in public health agencies
threatened by coastal storms and other mega-disasters.
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As noted by Comfort and Resodihardjo,3 interactions among
public health staff under rapidly altering conditions are not well
understood. The primary aim of this article was to explore the
crisis decision-making processes carried out by 2 large suburban
health departments in responding to a natural disaster, while
also examining the intersecting relationships among other
established and emerging organizations across the health system.
We investigated these themes through the theoretical lens of
Dynes’ disaster typology, which distinguishes between estab-
lished and emerging decision-making processes. The findings
presented here are important in that they build on the disaster
research literature pertaining to crisis decision-making.
Impetus for This Study
Many of the challenges that the 2 health departments had
in carrying out crisis decision-making efforts with other
organizations during Hurricane Sandy were outlined in a
video-recorded focus group discussion with 6 county public
health commissioners from lower New York State that was
held in January 2013 at Columbia University and was
moderated by one of the investigators (DMA).4 Statements
made during this initial focus group discussion highlighted
several intra-agency coordination problems in relation to the
Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Capabilities,
such as biosurveillance, community resilience, medical
countermeasures and mitigation, incident management,
information management, and surge management. Descrip-
tions of the unforeseen burdens placed on the regional public
health sector subsequently became the focus of a proposed
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)-funded
study awarded in September 2013. Although there is a
substantial amount of public health research literature on
crisis decision-making, the authors noted that there are few
studies specifically focusing on extreme coastal storms.
A primary aim of this study was thus to explore the unique
ways in which various organizational disaster response
strategies were carried out.
Theoretical Framework
The investigators relied upon a framework of emergent
organizations and roles developed by Dynes (1970) as a
means to capture the process and evolving nature of organi-
zational behavior during the emergency period of a disaster.
Dynes’ typology classifies organizations along 2 dimensions:
tasks and structure (Figure 1).5,6
According to Dynes, tasks can be categorized as either regular
or irregular and organizational structure is characterized as old
or new, resulting in 4 types of organized responses to disasters.
Type I organizations are established institutions that rely
upon a previously recognized structure and carry out routine
tasks during disasters. For example, police and fire depart-
ments are well-established organizations whose routine
mission is one of emergency response and who will respond in
this fashion to a variety of disasters. Type II entities are
institutions that expand their organizational structure in
order to quickly respond to disasters, as they also carry out
regular tasks. However, in so doing so, they depend on new
structural arrangements. For instance, a social services agency
is routinely staffed by professional workers, but following a
disaster the structure may expand to incorporate volunteers
and interactions with other emerging groups. Type III, or
extending organizations, are usually not anticipated as being
responder organizations. They are characterized by a pre-
existing structure, but during disasters they perform irregular
tasks. For example, a private bus company might be involved
in transporting nursing home residents to higher ground
during a hurricane evacuation. Lastly, Type IV, or emergent
organizations, involve a completely new structure and
irregular tasks. Overall, these organizations do not materialize
until the disaster takes place.6 A recent example would
include a community organization with a strong online
presence, such as Occupy Sandy, that develops an online
crowdsourced map to assist residents in finding open
pharmacies during a disaster.
Although the tasks carried out by the 2 health departments
were part of an existing (Types I and II) organizational
structure, the authors hypothesize that these agencies were
nonetheless faced with the need to develop and adapt to new
structural arrangements to handle various emerging crises.
Consequently, each public health agency navigated both
horizontally and vertically throughout Dynes’ topology,
carrying out regular and irregular tasks while also functioning
within old and new structures.6 The public health agencies
could thus be considered as organizations that sought to
provide linkages among other established and emergent
entities that had often never interacted before. This article
explores how and why these decisions and relationships were
formulated during the response to Hurricane Sandy. We also










Dynes’ Typology Classifies Organizations Along 2
Dimensions: Tasks and Structure.
Type I, established organized response ; Type II, expanding organized
response; Type III, extending organized response; Type IV, emergent
organized response.
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requires a reconceptualization of Dynes’ typology to better
encompass the role of local public health departments as
adaptive organizations needing to continually respond to
unpredictable and rapidly changing conditions.
METHODS
A qualitative collective case study approach was used to
evaluate the public health response based on triangulation of
one-on-one interviews with 30 key informants and 2 focus
groups with 17 participants in total. Each interview was
approximately 2 hours and the 2 focus groups lasted for
1 hour. The authors also used content analysis of situation
reports, annual reports, after action reports, and social media
posts to validate the qualitative findings.
The collective case study approach allowed for the detailed
examination of the public health workers at the sites in which
they worked and helped guide the investigation toward
developing an in-depth understanding of how the staff made
complex decisions regarding Hurricane Sandy.
Sample and Recruitment
The 2 suburban county public health agencies were invited to
participate in this study given that they resided in coastal
zones that had experienced catastrophic flooding and wind
damage from Hurricane Sandy. Likewise, these agencies
interacted with New York State’s Healthcare Evacuation
Center during and after the storm, which coordinated bed
placements for evacuees from New York City. The investi-
gators sought to document how the evacuation process
unfolded and impacted the lower New York State county
public health agencies along with other organizations they
collaborated with.
The authors identified and selected a purposive sample of key
public health senior staff at the agencies to interview. Orga-
nizational charts were provided by the 2 agencies to help
guide the selection process. Public health agency liaisons did
not make any recommendations of staff to include in the
actual interviews. The investigators selected interviewees on
the basis of their involvement in the strategic operations and
tactical decisions arising in preparation for and response to
Hurricane Sandy, in addition to their day-to-day responsi-
bilities. Informants were also selected on the basis of their role
in the incident command system. For the 2 focus groups, the
investigators contacted nursing home administrators in both
counties to discuss their experiences in collaborating with the
public health agencies during Hurricane Sandy. These
participants were selected on the basis of their level of
interaction with the public health agencies during the storm,
along with the level of damage experienced at the nursing
home facilities. All of the nursing home administrators who
participated had direct contact with their respective public
health agency on evacuation protocols and patient transfer
issues, which ultimately became emerging challenges of
interest to this study. Likewise, all of the nursing home
administrators worked in the coastal areas of each county that
had experienced catastrophic flooding.
Data Collection and Analysis
Each of the key informant interviews and focus groups was
audiotaped and transcribed. An extensive codebook was
developed to categorize the qualitative data, with coding ele-
ments drawn from the CDC’s PHEP Capabilities and the
National Health Security Preparedness Index. The authors
identified coding elements and used the ATLAS.ti qualitative
software program, version 7 (Scientific Software Development
GmbH, Berlin, Germany) to assign codes and sort the text. The
coding themes were iteratively identified in domains such as
community resilience, countermeasures and mitigation, inci-
dent management, information management and surge man-
agement, and biosurveillance. Subcodes were developed, such
as compliance, persuasion, responsibility, and expertise.
Content analysis of situation reports, annual reports, after
action reports, and social media posts helped to facilitate vali-
dation of data through cross-verification from different sources.
RESULTS
Hurricane Sandy, which struck New York Harbor on October
29, 2012, resulted in a number of routine and unforeseen
challenges for the 2 New York State county public health
agencies. Navigating around these challenges required
decision-making within the leadership structure by designated
leaders and new ones. When considering the disaster response
within Dynes’ Typology, there were a multitude of examples
of the ways in which public health staff carried out tasks in
each quadrant.
Type I: Established Organized Response
There were many examples of how the public agencies relied
upon an existing structure to carry out routine tasks during
the disaster, as staff communicated with the police, fire, and
emergency services departments on various issues noted in
Table 1. The majority of these disaster response coordination
efforts transpired at the county Emergency Operation Cen-
ters, as public health workers staffed the Emergency Support
Function – Public Health (ESF-8 health) desk, for which
coordination with other county agencies was anticipated as
part of the response.
Type II: Expanding Organized Response
Public health staff also directly responded to the disaster, as
they relied upon new structural arrangements with other
federal, state, and nonprofit organizations who assisted in the
response on specific tasks, as part of existing disaster plans
and newly formed Memoranda of Understanding. Within
this quadrant type, the expansion of volunteer services,
particularly from the Medical Reserve Corps, became much
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more pronounced. The primary tasks and structural arrange-
ments are listed in Table 2.
Type III: Extending Organized Response
As the disaster unfolded, interactions with emergent organi-
zations became more prominent and usually involved crisis
decision-making procedures with senior staff at each agency.
Decision-making pertained to coordination with private
organizations who were not previously expected to respond to
disasters but who were suddenly contacted for assistance with
irregular tasks. For the 2 health departments, many of these
decisions occurred during the staffing and management of
special needs shelters, in which unforeseen needs, such as
gaining access to new medications and laundering clothing
became urgently needed. Senior staff were able to develop
immediate Memoranda of Understanding with local busi-
nesses, public transportation companies, and nonprofits to
secure access to resources. The primary tasks and structural
arrangements are listed in Table 3.
Type IV: Emergent Organized Response
As Hurricane Sandy intensified and New York City hospitals
began to evacuate patients to neighboring counties, a number
of emergent problems came to the fore regarding the transport
and bed placement of patients, many of whom were elderly,
with limited physical, sensory, and cognitive abilities. In
several instances, the county public health agencies were not
aware that large numbers of elderly patients were entering
TABLE 2
Examples of the Ways in Which Public Health Staff Carried Out Tasks in Quadrant Type II: Expanding Organized
Responsea
Public Health Agency Task Relationships With Other Organizations
Managing surge of MRC volunteers Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), US Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), regional universities
Expanding shelter facilities and services with nonprofit partners Red Cross, faith-based nonprofit organizations
Expanding clinical services to include Tdap vaccinations CDC, New York State Department of Health, private medical suppliers
Staffing the county emergency operations center ESF-8 desk for
12-hour shifts
County Office of Emergency Management, New York State Department
of Health
aAbbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; ESF-8, Emergency Support Function – Public Health; MRC, Medical Reserve Corps.
TABLE 1
Examples of the Ways in Which Public Health Staff Carried Out Tasks in Quadrant Type I: Established Organized
Response
Public Health Agency Task Relationships With Other Organizations
Conducting restaurant inspections and identifying generator misuse Police, fire, and emergency services
Reestablishing electrical power generation and telecommunications Utility companies, Internet service providers
Contacting suppliers and vendors to ensure continuity of essential services Private medical suppliers
Maintaining vital records management Off-site records storage facilities
TABLE 3
Examples of the Ways in Which Public Health Staff Carried Out Tasks in Quadrant Type III: Extending Organized
Response
Public Health Agency Task Relationships With Other Organizations
Staffing special needs shelters with clinicians and administrative support from
other organizations
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), Red Cross
Developing memoranda of understanding with private businesses from across
the health system to help manage and maintain special needs shelter
Portable laundry businesses, oxygen supply companies,
visiting nurse services, medical waste companies
Developing memoranda of understanding with public transportation
agencies from across the health system to assist in nursing home evacuations
County transportation agencies, private bus companies,
nursing home liaisons
Gaining access to new medications to support special needs shelter
patients
Health care delivery, pharmacies, drug stores, medical
supply companies
Crisis Decision-Making During Hurricane Sandy
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness4
their health system from New York City. Consequently,
senior-level public health staff located in the surrounding
counties were faced with a surge in requests to house and care
for new evacuees, just as plans were being made to evacuate
other nursing home facilities within their suburban counties.
Two weeks after Hurricane Sandy struck the region, these
emergent issues only became more pronounced, with an
increasing reliance on the public health agencies’ expertise,
particularly when dealing with elderly nursing home residents
being transferred to special needs shelters or other nursing
home facilities. Given that many of these residents lacked
medical records or the specialized equipment that they
depended on, the public health agencies had to immediately
partner or coordinate services with a multitude of public and
private organizations listed in Table 4.
DISCUSSION
For the 2 public health agencies during Hurricane Sandy, the
need for integration of the traditional response agencies with
emergent communities intensified as the number of organi-
zations engaged in response operations increased and the
range of problems they confronted widened. Since most
organizations in the damaged areas were affected, regional
hospitals, nursing homes, special needs shelters, public
transportation companies, and private businesses became
participants in the response system, with the public health
agencies often establishing new relationships among them.
When dealing specifically with emergent challenges, such as
direct communication with elderly and frail residents, it was
evident in our examination of the data that the public health
agencies often lacked situational awareness about where vul-
nerable populations were located or what specific medical needs
they had. After all, because of previous concerns about access to
private medical information, the agencies did not possess
Medicare health insurance claims or registries to identify
potentially vulnerable people, such as those dependent on
oxygen equipment and ventilators. Consequently, public health
staff were sometimes faced with the mounting challenge of
coordinating patient care in an overburdened health system.
When considering this phenomenon within Dynes’ typology,
the public health agencies faced considerable burdens as they
increasingly dealt with unforeseen challenges due to the
prolonged loss of power and fuel, combined with limited
situational awareness of impacted populations. Although the
public health agencies were principally “existing” organiza-
tional structures whose tasks shifted from existing to
expanding activities, in order to adopt to the chaotic disaster
environment and coordinate multiple agencies, they often
found themselves extending their organizational structures in
a number of innovative and emergent ways. Furthermore, as
boundary-spanning organizations, as illustrated in Figure 2,
the public health agencies often provided linkages among
TABLE 4
Examples of the Ways in Which Public Health Staff Carried Out Tasks in Quadrant Type IV: Emergent Organized
Responsea
Public Health Agency Task Relationships With Other Organizations
Responding to immediate patient bed availability requests from evacuating
hospitals and nursing home facilities
Regional hospitals, EMS, medical transport organizations, New York
State Healthcare Evacuation Center, New York City Department
of Health
Responding to frail, elderly homebound residents identified by door-to-door
public health surveyors
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), MRC, visiting nurse services
Delivering medical equipment and supplies from evacuated nursing home
patients to new facilities
Private nursing homes, private transportation companies
Coordinating other housing arrangements for special needs shelter patients
beyond 30 days
Hotels, nursing and assisted-living facilities, homeless shelters and
FEMA facilities
Responding to face-to-face and online rumors of disease and crime that
negatively impacted the willingness of community groups to interact with
the public health agencies
Community and faith-based organizations, television- and
radio-based media, social media
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FIGURE 2
Reconceptualization of Public Health Agencies’ Role in
Dynes’ Typology.
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other established and emergent entities that had often never
interacted before.
Dynes has asserted that the seemingly insurmountable
challenges posed by prioritization and resource allocation
during emergent events can be ameliorated to an extent by
reconceiving of disaster response processes, placing further
value on instantaneous crisis decision-making in a manner
that is less hierarchical.6 It is also necessary to consider Dynes’
model as part of a cross-disciplinary research continuum that
recognizes that emergent strategies need to accommodate
baseline planning as well as react to immediate changes
(Figure 3).7 This framework identifies that strategies are
developed with primary intentions based on the context in
which they were developed, but factors change that impact
the decision-making landscape and alter the actual realized
strategy.
Expanding on this, Raynor8 notes that there is often a
“Strategy Paradox,” with a need to face downstream con-
sequences before sufficient data are available to actually make
informed decisions. To escape this paradox, he asserts that
the role of the strategic planner is to make commitments that
create and preserve options available to the organization as
new information is released. This requires the integration of
defining the strategic dimensions that are relevant to an
organization and understanding likely extremes of how these
dimensions could play out.8
While there are many different models for navigating this,
emergency management and public health organizations
operate very similar to “networked organizations.” Networked
organizations are made up of formal and information systems
for collaborations and coordination. They are designed for
optimal flexibility and adaptability in uncertain environ-
ments. While there may be more rigid hierarchies within
certain units, the relationships between units are inherently
collaborative.9,10
With an appropriate adaptation of these concepts to the
vernacular of operations within the field of public health, the
tools established in support of these concepts become avail-
able to create real solutions to the decision-making leadership
and decision-support needs of public health response orga-
nizations. This includes identifying the development of
effective and appropriate information management systems
strategies as well as developing decision-making criteria
designed to ensure decisions are made at the lowest level in
the response hierarchy as possible.11
CONCLUSION
As a “mission area,” public health is not neatly circumscribed.
Other emergency support functions, such as transportation
(ESF-1), communications (ESF-2), and firefighting (ESF-4)
generally have clear organizational and task-specific bound-
aries. Given public health’s “mission” of ensuring a popula-
tion’s health and welfare and of the complex enterprise of
public and private institutions that routinely support this
mission, it is nearly inevitable that traditional incident
command structures are inadequate to the task of managing
and coordinating all the activities involved in maintaining
the public’s health. Dynes developed the typology of routine
and emergent organizations as a means of describing such
complex organizational behavior and then offered a further
critique of the conventional “military model” of command-and-
control which he described as often unable to accommodate
both routine and emergent organizations and behaviors.6
Among Dynes’ recommendations are to develop “problem-
solving models” rather than military models and to create
incident management systems that allow for “decentralized and
pluralistic decision-making” and that permit what he referred to
as “open system[s] of coordinated effort.”
This analysis of “extending” and “emergent” public health
response systems during Hurricane Sandy echoed analyses of
public health response from other disasters, particularly
Hurricane Katrina.12 As occurred with public health officials
in Louisiana and Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina, the
public health officials in the New York metropolitan area
were confronted with interdependent systems, lapses in
leadership or judgment at local health institutions, and
competing agendas. Consider that during Hurricane Sandy,
several hospitals discharged their noncritical patients home in
the days leading up to the storm. This created a “surge” of
community-based patients for home health care and visiting
nurse agencies that would soon be exacerbated by the fuel
and power outages. This home health workforce was not
deemed to be “essential personnel” and was often unable to
get priority access to fuel and supplies. Community-based
patients were often unable to manage their health care, often
including a need for medications of complex therapeutic
FIGURE 3
Relationship of Emergent Strategies to Intended
Strategies.
From Carpenter et al, 2009, with permission.7
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regimens, and some sought help in over-burdened special
needs shelters. The tasks of identifying this community-based
need, coordinating a response of supplies and personnel, and
ensuring that this “extended” response system was working
fell to public health. As occurred during Hurricane Katrina,
the public health practitioners during Hurricane Sandy
were often overwhelmed by the magnitude of the need and
were also often operating in environments of insufficient
situational awareness.
The complexity of managing the public health “mission
space” was certainly illustrated in the experiences of these
2 large county public health departments during and in the
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. Some of the innovations that
emerged from these experiences also point the way toward
solutions. In one of the counties, in the months after the
storm, the public health commissioner began meeting with a
group of nursing home operators whose institutions were
situated in flood-prone coastline communities. These nursing
home operators welcomed the opportunity to plan for future
emergencies and recognized the elements of their operations
that had been “expanded” and “extended” during Hurricane
Sandy and their dependence upon their public health
agencies for assistance.
Although Dynes’ typology was conceived long ago, the role of
public health and its interactions with established and
emergent entities within the typology remains unclear and in
flux, thus warranting further investigation. As this study has
shown, public health agencies are sometimes considered first-
responder organizations, while they also deal with emerging
crises that demand unique forms of decision-making with
previously unidentified community groups and vulnerable
populations.
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